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Abstract  
Welfare-state regimes achieve different outcomes in dealing with social inequalities. For 
example, the social democratic or Scandinavian welfare-state regime is often considered as 
the most egalitarian with a high social transfer rate and a comparably low level of income 
inequality. While most research on welfare-state regimes focuses on objective indicators of 
quality of life and inequalities, we are interested in how citizens actually evaluate their lives, 
using subjective well-being (SWB) as an indicator. The paper deals with two research 
questions: (1) How does the welfare-state regime affect subjective well-being, and (2) does 
the welfare-state regime influence the effect of status on SWB? Status is an essential first-
order goal to produce subjective well-being according to the social production theory of 
Lindenberg and colleagues (Ormel et al. 1999), but is also linked to many other instrumental 
goals such as comfort and stimulation. The study carries out a multilevel analysis using 
pooled European Social Survey data from the years 2002–2012, covering more than 30 
European countries. While we first look at how status drives SWB levels in different welfare-
state regimes as classified by (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999), our focus is mainly on cross-
level interactions between welfare-state regime type and the relationship between status and 
SWB. Our results provide evidence that social-democratic welfare-state regimes not only 
provide for living standards that are associated with the highest SWB levels, but also 
compensate best for status differences in SWB compared to other welfare-state regimes.  
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1 Introduction 
The level of subjective well-being (SWB) in a country is a major indicator of its quality of life 
and ‘liveability’ (Veenhoven 2001). What kind of society provides the best living conditions 
is a longstanding research question. According to decades of quality of life research and 
studies on SWB (Diener and Suh 1997; Diener 2009), a ‘good society’1 or ‘liveable society’ 
may be considered one that ensures high living conditions and, at the same time, minimizes 
the link between individual level conditions, such as status, and SWB by compensating for 
certain disadvantages, such as income inequalities that may be associated with lower SWB. 
However societies differ in the way they set about enabling a good life for all citizens. This is 
exemplified by the various welfare-state regimes present in different countries. Looking at 
research to date quickly reveals profound country differences in SWB and the effects of 
individual level determinants on SWB (Böhnke 2008; Bonini 2008; Pedersen and Schmidt 
2009). Major factors for divergence in SWB between various welfare-state models are 
“economic performance, the social security level, and the political culture in a country—all in 
all, general conditions that enable people to live a respectable life” (Böhnke 2008, p. 189). 
From a social inequality perspective the question is how the welfare-state regime, as a macro 
characteristic, shapes SWB. On the individual level, the question is how markers of 
inequality, such as status, predict SWB, and how these are shaped by macro characteristics. 
Welfare-state regimes not only impact objective inequalities and quality of life, but also how 
individuals subjectively perceive inequality with clear consequences for their subjective well-
being. Thus, in this paper we will explore how welfare-state regimes impact a) the societal 
SWB level and b) the relationship between status and SWB link on the individual level. 
Our study makes several original contributions to the field of social indicators 
research. Empirical studies comparing different societies from a social inequality perspective 
has focused to date primarily on the distribution of goods and positions as well as whether a 
                                                 
1  We are interested in the subjective well-being of people on the individual and macro level. In this 
sense, we study what people might evaluate to be a good and liveable society, leaving the question aside of what 
a good society constitutes or whether it is at all possible to define a good society. 
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society succeeds in mitigating differences in the acquisition of status, income, prestige or 
education (Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000), while neglecting the individual-level perceptions 
of inequality. According to Thomas and Thomas (1928), the subjective perception of a 
situation is even more important for behavior and, in particular, decision-making, than 
objective characteristics. More recently, Veenhoven (2005, p. 352) claims that happiness 
measured as the subjective perception of living conditions is “possibly a better indicator than 
the income disparities that are central to comparative inequality research.” Furthermore, our 
study aims to contribute to scientific debate on the impact of social inequalities on SWB or 
happiness. While an established body of literature in social research stresses that inequality 
harms societies and, in particular, how living standards affect the perceived quality of 
individual lives (Stiglitz 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010), others oppose these views 
(Snowdon 2010; cf. Zagorski et al. 2014). Some studies in fact that take into account 
economic prosperity (GDP indicators) find no effect of income inequality on SWB (Kelley 
and Evans 2012; Zagorski et al. 2014) and indeed find even a slightly positive correlation 
between income inequality and SWB after controlling for GDP (Berg and Veenhoven 2010).  
This study will first describe how status and SWB are linked, drawing to this end 
mainly on social production theory, which includes status as a first-order instrumental goal in 
the production of well-being. Our hypothesis is that status and SWB are positively associated. 
Secondly, we develop an explanation with regard to how the welfare-state regime model 
affects SWB. Our key argument is that because welfare-state regimes differ in how they 
redistribute goods and resources, they also fare differently in their ability to enhance living 
conditions and, consequently, SWB. Moreover apart from affecting SWB on the macro level, 
we will further argue that the welfare-state regime will diminish status effects on SWB 
through their redistributive function. The empirical analysis is based on European Social 
Survey data with the relationship between macro and micro factors modeled as cross-level 
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interactions. In the final section, we summarize and discuss our results in light of the varied 
debates introduced above. 
 
 
2 The Link between Status and Subjective Well-Being 
Subjective well-being (SWB) is defined in terms of ‘how people evaluate their lives—both at 
the moment and for longer periods’, which is a ‘broad category of phenomena that includes 
people’s emotional responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgments of life satisfaction’ 
(Diener et al. 1999:277). SWB is comprised of both a cognitive and an affective component. 
Whereas the cognitive component is based on a (rational) consideration of past, present and 
future conditions, affective evaluation is based on emotions and feelings (see Diener 1994). 
SWB is influenced by individual level factors such as status which is a major marker of 
inequality in classical sociological research and encompasses such diverse factors as income, 
unemployment, living in a committed relationship, network of friends and relatives (social 
capital) as well as health (e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2005; Hadjar and Backes 2013). Furthermore, 
there are macro level impacts on SWB such as economic prosperity and the welfare-state 
regime (Bonini 2008; Böhnke 2008; Hadjar and Backes 2013). 
In the first part of our analyses we focus on the micro level factor of status, which is 
strongly related to other important issues in social inequality research such as income and 
education. Social Production Function theory (Ormel et al. 1999) provides a general 
framework for determining well-being, and it places status prominently among the five first-
order instrumental goals (stimulation, comfort, status, behavioral confirmation and affection). 
To what extent the instrumental goal of status can be attained, for example through control 
over resources, depends on individual resources, which includes level of education, special 
skills and social class (Ormel et al. 1999: 67). Furthermore, status is strongly linked to other 
first-order goals in the production of well-being, as high status more often than not aligns with 
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higher income (comfort), better opportunities to do stimulating leisure time activities or work 
in fulfilling jobs (stimulation), and, finally, with a larger social network (affection). For this 
reason status seemed a strong selection for our analysis. 
The positive association between status and SWB is well-documented. Whereas a 
change in activities and endowments has a short-term impact on SWB, resources and their use 
are linked to long-term effects on SWB. Upward social mobility, for example, is assumed to 
produce status and, thus, higher levels of SWB (e.g. Hadjar and Samuel 2015). 
Conceptualizing the link between status and SWB can be based on two lines of thought with 
the first of these regarding the strong link between status and income. Although income gains 
are not always and linearly linked to a rise in SWB, empirical evidence shows that wealthier 
individuals report higher SWB levels (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Di Tella et al. 2003), due to 
income acting as a prerequisite to live a comfortable life and satisfy individual needs. The 
second argument relates to status as a positional good that is “either (1) scarce in some 
absolute or socially imposed sense or (2) subject to crowding through more extensive use” 
(Hirsch 1977, p. 27). A higher status provides a stronger position for social comparison 
(Festinger 1954), as higher-status people are more able to positively evaluate their status 
relative to others (e.g. Samuel et al. 2013). According to Festinger’s social comparison theory 
(1954), individuals are able to make a positive self-evaluation, an essential prerequisite of 
well-being, through social comparisons with reference groups (see Hadjar and Samuel 2015). 
The value of status as a valuable positional good in itself is also described in sociological 
theories that refer to the “status maintenance motive” as a major driving force behind 
educational decisions and social mobility (e.g. Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Treiman, 1970; 
Stocké, 2007). The above leads to the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis I: Status is positively associated with SWB.  
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3 Welfare-State Regimes and Social Inequality 
Differences in status are clear indicators of social inequality on the individual level. Welfare-
state regimes differ in how they deal with social inequality by redistributing goods, thereby 
enabling the social-economic environment for acceptable living standards for all citizens and 
mitigating status effects on subjective well-being (SWB). The decisions of the welfare-state 
on how to redistribute goods thus affects the ways in which individuals can satisfy their 
needs. This study considers two impacts of the welfare-state regime at the macro level: firstly, 
we consider the direct effect of the welfare-state regime on SWB, as welfare-state regimes 
aim to ensure that welfare is in fact perceived at the individual level. Secondly, we consider 
how different welfare-state models impact the extent to which status affects SWB, as welfare-
state regimes are conceived to diminish relative disadvantage and social inequalities more 
broadly. Both arguments are strongly related, as the level of inequality is related to SWB 
levels in society, although, as we will return to later, there is some debate as to whether 
inequality diminishes or increases SWB levels.  
Welfare-state regimes result from historical, political, and cultural developments. 
Definitions differ considerably between countries and social welfare is a key issue in political 
discourse, particularly with regard to the need for modern societies to be both economically 
competitive and socially fair. Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 37) distinguishes between different 
welfare-state regimes, focusing on decommodification and stratification as major pillars of 
social policy: decommodification refers to “the degree to which individuals, or families, can 
uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation”. Thus, 
a common denominator of all welfare-state policies is to secure a minimum level of welfare 
for all citizens and welfare-state regimes differ in the ways they accomplish this task. We 
argue that the level of SWB indicates how successful certain welfare-state models have been 
in creating the conditions for decent standards of living. This is expected to be net of effects 
concerning income inequality, which will be related to SWB. The link between welfare-state 
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regime and social inequality can be theorized with reference to Esping-Andersen’s now well-
traveled typologies (1990). As indicated above, stratification, the order of social relations, is 
the second key dimension of Esping-Andersen’s theory (1990, p. 23), according to which 
welfare-state regimes as “systems of stratification” do not only offset social inequalities, but 
also create new ones, and reproduce those which already exist. The social policies of different 
welfare-state systems affect the distribution of incomes and the distribution of resources more 
broadly. Thus, the welfare-state regime contributes to the issue of whether or not the state 
ensures the best possible standard of life for all, independent of inequality characteristics such 
as social background, gender or race. The original welfare-state regime theoretical framework 
by Esping-Andersen (1990) received a lot of criticism as empirical studies hint at deviations, 
outliers, or neglected cases (cf. Schubert et al. 2008; Scruggs and Allan 2006). The main 
challenges to welfare-state typologies relate to the fact that they are “developed on a selection 
of country cases” (Ebbinghaus 2011, p. 19) and that gaps between ideal-typical and real 
welfare states appear in empirical analysis (Arts and Gelissen 2002). Many scholars asked if 
there are more (Castles and Mitchell 1990) or less (Beer et al. 2001; Bonoli 1997) than the 
three “worlds of capitalism”. From such debates two new types of welfare-state regimes 
emerged including the Southern welfare-state regime (Ferrera 1996) and the post-socialist 
welfare-state regime (Aidukaite 2004; Deacon 1993) that cannot be subsumed into one of the 
former categories, representing a heterogeneous group of countries in and of themselves. In 
light of such shortcomings, many scholars prefer using metric welfare-state regime 
characteristics such as GDP expenditure on welfare and the Gini coefficient in regard to 
inequalities in income distribution or the minimum wage (Schubert et al. 2008; Bonini 2008). 
Some of these new developments and criticisms have been incorporated in a modified version 
of Esping-Andersen’s typology (1999). 
 Although aware of the difficulties of classifying welfare-state regimes, we apply 
nevertheless the modified typology of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) in developing our thesis 
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for two reasons. First, the model is of high heuristic value as a theoretical tool for 
comparisons between welfare-state regimes and social inequality. And second because 
empirical studies using different characteristics at the same time showed trade-offs between 
different social welfare models (see Hega and Hokenmaier 2002 for an example of a trade-off 
between social and education policy). It is therefore highly interesting and relevant to focus 
on typologies that have been derived via the analyses of an extensive set of characteristics. In 
analyzing how welfare-state regimes vary in their wealth distribution policies, the conceptual 
framework developed encompasses five types: (1) the conservative, (2) liberal, and (3) social-
democratic welfare-state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990), as well as (4) the family-oriented 
welfare-state regime (Esping-Andersen 1999) and (5) post-socialist welfare-state regime 
(Deacon 1993; Blossfeld et al. 2008).  
 
 
4 How Welfare-State Regimes Impact Subjective Well-Being 
In order to theorize the link between types of welfare-state regime and subjective well-being 
(SWB), it is necessary to explore how social policies affect major individual determinants of 
SWB and, in particular, how the welfare-state model compensates for disadvantages in terms 
of social inequality and social stratification, including, for example, how the system supports 
lower-status citizens. As previously outlined, welfare-state policies particularly address 
income disparities (Esping-Andersen 1990) and explicitly or implicitly strive to provide a 
minimum income, which can allow for decent food and housing, thereby ensuring that nobody 
in society is disadvantaged when it comes to basic needs. Strong welfare-state regimes which 
strongly strive to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all citizens should also be 
characterized by higher SWB levels (cf. Korpi and Palme, 1998). But why should that be the 
case? Firstly, for the average SWB level in society, the SWB of socially disadvantaged groups 
is of crucial concern, as they are characterized by the lowest levels of SWB. If welfare-state 
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regimes succeed in alleviating social and economic precarity, socially disadvantaged groups 
should almost disappear and it would be expected that their SWB levels will be higher than in 
comparative countries with weak welfare-state regimes. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) argue 
along these lines when they stress that social inequalities in terms of differential access to 
goods, services and positions, signaled by income inequalities and a high degree of social 
stratification, go hand-in-hand with the social disadvantage of lower and middle class groups 
(see Zagorski et al. 2014).  
The above point made by Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) is linked to a second 
contention related to the perception of inequalities as well as attitudes towards such 
inequalities. Income inequality is perceived as unjust and harmful by most in society. The 
perception of unjust inequalities may correspond to reduced SWB levels (Hanssen 2011; Noll 
and Weick 2012). Those in society who adhere to inequality-averse values and attitudes 
perceive inequalities as a social problem and will show reduced SWB if they perceive high 
levels of inequality. It would follow then that welfare-state regimes, which are weaker in 
diminishing inequality, will exhibit lower SWB. This is supported by Noll and Weick (2012) 
who find a positive correlation between the acceptance of social inequalities and SWB. 
Findings from Alesina et al. (2004) moreover suggest that the link between inequality and 
happiness is moderated by principals of social inequality that relate to the question of whether 
people are averse towards inequalities.  
A third line of thought comes from social comparison theory (Festinger 1954) and 
reference group theory (Merton and Kitt 1950; Hyman and Singer 1968): higher inequalities 
and strong social stratification correspond to higher levels of social comparison as well as 
higher levels of relative poverty, as more individuals perceive their living conditions as worse 
than those of other reference groups. Marx illustrates this social phenomenon as follows: “A 
house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise small, it satisfies 
all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and 
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the little house shrinks to a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no 
social position at all to maintain” (Marx [1847], p. 84). Zagorski et al. (2014) mention social 
comparison, yet reject it. They stress that society as a whole functions as a reference group 
and that in developed and prosperous societies the income of the generalized other (Berger et 
al. 1972) is perceived as far above the median. The consequences of this are that the average 
citizen perceives themselves to be disadvantaged in comparison to the rest of society which 
negatively impacts SWB levels. Recently Delhey and Kohler (2011) found a correlation 
between inequality, a present factor in diverse welfare-state regimes, and SWB, which 
counters earlier results from Veenhoven (2000)2. They use a measure for SWB inequality that 
corrects for instrument effects, rather than the use of standard deviation which has been 
common in most research. In light of recent evidence and our literature review, we 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis II: The welfare-state regime is linked to SWB levels. 
 
This hypothesis is rather explorative and leaves the question of which welfare-state regime is 
associated with which SWB premium or penalty aside. As we attempt to find answers to that 
question, we add a theoretical scenario to our general hypothesis. Of all welfare-state regimes, 
the social-democratic or Scandinavian type (e.g. Norway, Sweden) is making the clearest 
effort to provide its citizens with a socially and economically secure life, redistributing wealth 
by employing tax laws and security institutions (Esping-Andersen 1990). Therefore countries 
in this category will exhibit the greatest SWB premium. Conservative welfare-states such as 
Germany and Luxembourg do not redistribute wealth to the same extent. They tend to display 
lower levels of social welfare, using the principle of subsidiarity where the state only 
                                                 
2  Veenhoven (2000) found no effects of the welfare state and its size on the societal SWB level. This null 
finding is explained through referring to the need fulfillment thesis. From this perspective, the question of 
income inequality is insignificant and does not pose a problem as long as needs are fulfilled. However in line 
with Diener and Lucas (2000), it is not only a question of how the welfare state develops and implements policy, 
but also how this is perceived by individuals in terms of whether they recognize that specific needs are being 
fulfilled. 
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intervenes when, for example, citizens are unable to find gainful employment or source 
financial means from family members. Comparing this to the social-democratic welfare-state 
regime, the conservative welfare-state regime will experience a SWB penalty. In contrast to 
the social-democratic and conservative welfare-state regimes, the principle of the free market 
is the bedrock of the liberal welfare-state model (Esping-Andersen 1990) exemplified in 
Europe with the UK as well as Switzerland, although, as noted by Trampusch (2010), the 
latter also includes some characteristics of the conservative type. The liberal welfare-state 
provides minimal support and aims to intervene as little as possible. Compared to the social-
democratic welfare-state regime we would expect the SWB penalty to be relatively small. 
Family-oriented or Southern welfare-state regimes such as Greece and Portugal are 
characterized by the prominent role of families in providing welfare and generally high levels 
of inequality and stratification. The state provides only limited support, and clientelism, as 
well as patronage, are common (Ferrera 1996). Consequently, countries belonging to this type 
will also experience a SWB penalty in comparison to the social-democratic model. While the 
welfare-state regimes discussed to this point are each characterized by how to produce or 
enable welfare, post-socialist welfare-states such as Estonia and Poland are rather diverse with 
regard to the ways they enable social welfare (Blossfeld et al. 2008). Although heterogeneity 
in this grouping of post-socialist welfare-states is high, they also share several characteristics 
relevant to the investigation of macro level SWB such as the gap between rich and poor, 
which feeds into considerable inequality alongside high levels of social stratification (Böhnke 
2008; Bonini 2008). This set of characteristics is likely to yield the greatest SWB penalty 
compared to the social-democratic welfare-state regime. 
The above shows that welfare-state regimes not only have an effect on macro SWB 
factors but also affect SWB indirectly through how they compensate for social disadvantage 
such as a low status. Welfare-state regimes that succeed in equalizing inequalities will display 
lower status effects on SWB and vice versa. The more unequal the distribution of income and 
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other goods and positions is, the more individuals will compare themselves with others 
leading to frustration. It would be possible to counter this through, for example, social 
transfers that mitigate income and prestige differences between employment groups. This is 
towards ensuring that those resources that are decisive in attaining instrumental goals, in turn 
affecting SWB, are more equally distributed, which should lead to differences in the effect of 
status on SWB being reduced. Moreover social comparisons that would decrease SWB are 
also less likely to occur. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis III: The welfare-state regime impacts the link between status and SWB. 
 
The hypothetical scenario assumed is that the effect of status on SWB is lowest in social-
democratic countries since those countries are best-placed to compensate for disadvantages 
that arise from inequalities. The opposite to this scenario is assumed to be represented by 
post-socialist countries as inequality is here highly prevalent and poorly compensated for by 
the welfare-state.  
When analyzing any overlap between the welfare-state regime and SWB, economic 
prosperity needs to be taken into account. GDP is a key predictor of SWB on the macro level, 
and the welfare-state regimes under analysis differ in their level of affluence.3 The level of 
economic prosperity as well as the absence of unemployment, an indicator of economic 
strength, have proven to be essential determinants of the ‘liveability’ of a society (Veenhoven 
2001; Böhnke 2008) and, moreover, been shown to be strong predictors of SWB (Inglehart 
and Klingemann 2000; Di Tella et al. 2003). Wealth also correlates with “human rights, 
equality, individualism, more schooling, more food, more doctors, greater income equality, 
and greater longevity” (Böhnke 2008:193; Diener and Suh 1999). Economic prosperity may 
impact both inequalities and SWB at the same time: “Developed nations have better 
                                                 
3  At the national level, the social-democratic welfare-state regime is positively correlated with GDP and 
the post-socialist welfare-state regime negatively correlated with GDP. The other welfare-state regimes were not 
significantly associated with GDP.  
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infrastructure (schools, health, transport, law, welfare, etc.) providing welfare-state type 
benefits the poor would otherwise lack, which increases their SWB and further reduces 
inequality” (Zagorski et al. 2014, p. 1091). Those strong welfare-state regimes with high 
levels of decommodification, in particular social-democratic or northern welfare-states, are 
characterized by high economic prosperity (Schmid 2002). Many liberal welfare-state regimes 
however also share this characteristic, as indicated by GDP, but, in contrast, show low levels 
of decommodification. To investigate the true effects of the welfare-state regime on SWB, 
which demands controlling for the heterogeneity present within welfare-state regimes such as 
the post-socialist type, we will control for gross domestic product per capita (GDP) in our 
analyses, as this is a reliable indicator of economic prosperity (cf. Hadjar and Backes 2013). 
Modelling welfare-state regimes and GDP simultaneously will show the genuine effects of the 
welfare-state regime net of economic prosperity. This net effect will help gauge how welfare-
state regimes in dealing with inequalities cause different SWB effects. 
Finally, controlling for GDP also means taking into account unemployment rate as 
another important factor of subjective well-being (Veenhoven 2001; Böhnke 2008; Inglehart 
and Klingemann 2000; Di Tella et al. 2001, 2003). This link can be conceptualized 
considering (the aggregation of) certain micro-level mechanisms. Individual unemployment 
means exclusion from the society and has a strong negative impact on individual subjective 
well-being (Di Tella et al. 2001; Clark and Oswald 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 
1998), as it goes along with status decline, income loss, and psychological stress (Ervasti and 
Venetoklis 2010). Furthermore, unemployment rate is a widely perceived indicator of the 
current state of a society and in particular the economy that impacts individual perceptions 
and well-being (Terwey 1990; cf. Hadjar and Backes 2013). As GDP is linked to 
unemployment – the higher the GDP is, the lower is the unemployment in a country –, we can 
only include one of these factors in our models to avoid multicollinearity given the low 
number of macro level units. 
14 
5 Data, Measures, and Methods 
5.1 Data 
We employ a cumulative data-set comprising all six waves (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
and 2012) from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a cross-sectional survey 
conducted biannually with between 22 and 31 countries, depending on the wave. In total 36 
countries have participated in the ESS since the first research wave. Our final models include 
between 116658 and 184059 cases drawn from between 28 and 34 countries.4 The pooling of 
data allows us to reduce the small sample bias at the macro level and to get more precise 
estimates at both the individual and macro level. However it is accepted selection bias may 
affect our results. Owing to this risk it was decided to only include respondents who are non-
migrants and between 25 and 80 years of age. Migrants who were not born in the respective 
country of analysis were excluded as individuals, since they are likely to have had a different 
socialization experience (see Hadjar and Backes 2013). 
 
5.2 Measures 
SWB is operationalized to reflect both affective and cognitive dimensions. The affective 
dimension of SWB, happiness, is measured by answers to the following question: “Taking all 
things together, how happy would you say you are?” Life satisfaction, the cognitive 
dimension, uses the following question: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with 
your life as a whole nowadays?” Both scales employ 11-point scales ranging from 0 
“extremely unhappy/dissatisfied” to 10 “extremely happy/satisfied”. Cronbach’s α for this 
two-item scale is 0.83. 
The welfare-state regime, our key macro level predictor, has been categorized 
following the typologies of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) and Blossfeld et al. (2008): the 
                                                 
4  Countries included are Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Kosovo, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Slowakia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine.  
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social-democratic type (e.g. Sweden, Denmark), the conservative type (e.g. Germany, 
Luxembourg), the family-oriented type (e.g. Greece, Spain), the liberal type (e.g. the UK, 
Switzerland), and the post-socialist welfare states (e.g. Estonia, Poland).5  
Because we are interested in the net effect of the welfare-state regime, we control for 
gross domestic product per capita (GDP) as a key indicator of economic prosperity. The GDP 
data collected by the World Bank (2015) relates to the gross value of all produced goods and 
services. We have standardized GDP per capita in U.S. dollars amending the respective 
equivalent rates of exchange per country and wave. From 2002 to 2012, Luxembourg and 
Norway show, on average, the highest GDP level, while Ukraine and Kosovo are at the other 
end of the scale. For the data analysis, we used the GDP log to normalize the distribution by 
reducing the weight of outliers and linearizing the SWB relationship.  
Furthermore, we are using a Gini measure provided by Eurostat (2015). It considers 
equivalized disposable income before social transfers. Pensions are excluded from social 
transfers but they are included in this Gini measure. We chose this specific Gini measure, as 
we have respondents in our sample who have reached retirement age and whose income will 
in many cases be derived from pensions. We exclude social transfers so as to prevent 
multicollinearity with our welfare-state regime variables. 
Our main individual level independent variable is occupational status measured 
through the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) by Harry Ganzeboom, Paul de Graaf, 
and Donald Treiman (1992). This scale ranges from 16 to 90. Illustrative scores are, for 
example, 90 for judges and 23 for garbage collectors (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996).6  
We further control for other important predictors of SWB: Education (net of status) is 
linked to cognitive capabilities to satisfy ones needs, and thus, to SWB (Hadjar et. al. 2008). 
                                                 
5  For a welfare-state regime classification of the countries please refer to table note b in Table 1. 
6  Modeling ISEI as having a linear effect is common practice. Clearly, it is attractive to entertain the idea 
of the non-linear effect of ISEI on SWB. For example, SWB premiums might decrease with increasing status. 
However, in following a cautious estimation strategy it was decided not to include a quadratic term of ISEI as 
there is no theoretical basis to do so. We will therefore slightly underestimate the effect of ISEI on SWB.  
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We use a dichotomous variable that indicates whether someone has at least an ISCED level of 
3a (upper secondary degree, high) and above. Moreover health has been found to be a major 
predictor of SWB and we therefore include a variable that measures subjective health using a 
scale ranging from 1 = “very good” to 5 = “very bad”. We reversed the scale to allow for a 
more intuitive interpretation of estimates. As unemployment also proved to have a profound 
negative impact on SWB (e.g. Di Tella et al. 2001, 2003; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 
1998), we control for this condition as well using a variable that indicates whether or not the 
respondent has been unemployed and was looking for a job during the last seven days before 
the interview. In addition, further controls are used in respect of gender and age as important 
drivers of SWB. We have here introduced age squared to account for the non-linear 
relationship of age with SWB. When pooling data from different research waves, estimates 
may well be driven by factors that were characteristic for that particular historical time. We 
therefore control for period effects using dummies to indicate the round of data collection. To 
further simplify the interpretation of our models, we standardize (z transformation) our 
variables (see Table 1 for summary and descriptive information). 
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics of research and control variables 
Variable Operationalization Descriptivesa 
Subjective Well-Being 
Two-item scale reflecting affectual and 
cognitive dimension of SWB: happiness and 
life satisfaction 
Mean (SD) 
6.62 (2.11) 
Status International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) Mean(SD) 42.95(17.76) 
GDP Logged GDP per capita, by country, and period Mean(SD) 9.93(0.77) 
Gini 
Gini coefficient of equivalized disposable 
income before social transfers by country and 
period (pensions excluded from social transfers, 
i.e., they are included in this Gini measure) 
Mean(SD) 
36.00(2.94) 
Welfare-state regimes 
Welfare-state regime, based on Esping-
Andersen (1990, 1999) and 
Blossfeld et al. (2008) 
Conservativeb = 27.51% 
Social-democratic = 4.19% 
Family-oriented = 19.64% 
Liberal = 12.54% 
Post-socialist = 36.11% 
(proportions on the individual 
level) 
Educational level Proportion of people with at least ISCED level 3a (upper secondary degree, high) and above 
ISCED level 3a and above = 
52.03% 
ISCED level below 3a = 
47.97% 
Age Age in years Mean(SD) 50.88(12.35) 
Age, squared Age in years, squared Mean (SD) 2741.71 (1289.23) 
Subjective general health (1 very bad, 5 very good) Mean(SD) 3.56(0.89) 
Unemployed Unemployed, looking actively for job (last 7 days) vs. all other 4.00% 
Female Self-reported sex 54.16% 
a. Weighted (population size weight, design weight).n is between 171,743 and 184,222 for all level 1 variables. 
b. Conservative: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; Social-democratic: Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden; Family-oriented: Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey; Liberal: Great Britain, and 
Switzerland; Post-socialist: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, 
Slowakia, and Ukraine.      
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5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Analytical Strategy 
We employ multilevel models with individuals who reside within countries representing 
diverse welfare-state types to test our hypotheses. We do not assume country-variant effects 
as regards our key variables on SWB. This is mainly because there is no conceptual and 
empirical reason to assume that any random effect will be uncorrelated with any one of our 
explanatory variables. This said there will be variation in the effects across welfare-state 
regimes and country-specific effects of unobserved variables. We therefore estimate random 
intercept models using robust standard errors (Eicker-Huber-White method). This allows for 
relaxing assumptions about the homoskedasticity and normality of the error terms in 
estimating consistent results. 
The first model (Model I, null model) serves to gauge the amount of variance on level 
2. We then extend the model to include all variables on level 1 (Model II). To analyze the 
effects of the welfare-state regime, the respective variables are entered next (Model III). Our 
main hypothesis that there will be a status-well-being link that varies across different welfare-
state regimes implies a cross-level interaction between status and welfare-state regime. To 
carefully explore this relationship we add an interaction between our status variable and the 
welfare-state regime variable in Model IV.7 As previously argued, the affluence of a society is 
likely to affect the level of SWB and we therefore add the logged gross domestic capita per 
year as a control separately for each country in our data set (Model V). To rule out the effects 
of income inequality that would presumably partly or entirely explain inequalities in SWB, 
we further include the distribution of income using the Gini coefficient which includes 
pensions but before social transfers in Model VI. 
 
                                                 
7  As interaction effects are at times hard to interpret, we further ran pooled fixed effects regression 
models for the sets of welfare-state regimes to explore the complexity of our core models (tables available on 
request). 
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5.3.2 Influential Level Two Units 
A problem may be that individual countries exhibit value patterns or other specific 
characteristics, such as high unemployment rates that bias the results. Furthermore, countries 
on level 2 are not a random sample and comparably few. If some countries prove to be 
outliers, this may bias the results considerably. This may either be directly via variables on 
level 2 or indirectly, through countries acting as moderators. To test whether our findings are 
affected by outliers on the country level, we analyze the standardized differences in parameter 
estimates (DFBETAs) between the model using the full data set and the subset of models that 
excludes one level-two unit. Following Verbakel (2013), we calculate DFBETAs for all 
variables, in all models presented. As we are interested in unbiased estimates of status, we 
focus on this variable in each of the models.  
In the full model (Model VI) the DFBETAs for status indicate that Finland, Sweden, 
and Norway differ from the other countries. They also have Cook’s D values which are above 
the calculated cut off value for the level-two units of 0.143 (0.175, 0.338, and 0.613 
respectively). We reran Model VI excluding in turn the respective countries but did not find 
substantial changes in the estimation of the status variable or other variables.  
We are aware that this procedure provides only a statistical answer to the question of 
whether it is adequate to analyze various countries in one model. Giving a substantial answer 
would require unpacking the meaning of every variable for every country. While this would 
certainly yield interesting insights for the construction of country specific questionnaires, our 
focus in this study rests elsewhere.  
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6 Results 
The results of the multilevel analysis are presented in Table 2. The null model (Model I) 
shows that 21% of the variance in subjective well-being (SWB) is on level 2. This supports 
our analytical strategy where we model individuals nested within countries.8 Model II reveals 
that status has a positive effect on SWB, controlling for various important factors, thus 
providing evidence for Hypothesis I. Education and being a female are positively associated 
with SWB (Table 2, individual level 2 controls). Subjective health status is positively related 
to SWB, indicating that the better someone evaluates their health to be, the higher their SWB 
level. Unemployment is negatively associated with SWB. The effect of age on SWB follows a 
U-shaped curve (Table 2, individual level 2 controls).  
In Model III, these effects remain, in the main, unchanged with the inclusion of the 
welfare-state regime variable. As hypothesized, welfare-state regimes differ in their effects on 
SWB as was expected in Hypothesis II. Using social-democratic countries as a baseline, 
living in a post-socialist welfare-state regime causes the greatest SWB penalty followed by 
family-oriented, conservative, and liberal welfare-state regimes. These findings corroborate 
those expectations that were based on the theoretical scenario derived from Hypothesis II. 
Adding a cross-level interaction between status and the welfare-state regime in Model IV 
changes the interpretation of these variables. The fixed effect of ISEI is now the main effect 
of status on SWB in social-democratic countries only. This model thus shows that status does 
have a negative effect on SWB in social-democratic countries. The effects of the welfare-state 
regime follow the pattern outlined for Model III but have to be interpreted differently. 
Compared to individuals in social-democratic welfare-state regimes, respondents with an 
average status level experience the greatest SWB penalty when living in a post-socialist 
welfare-state regime. The interaction terms reveal how welfare-state regimes differ with 
regard to how they shape status effects on SWB. Using the example of living in a post-
                                                 
8  We furthermore calculated empirical Bayes estimates of the random intercepts showing considerable 
variation in SWB across countries. This further supports our analytic strategy. 
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socialist welfare-state regime, we find that although living in a post-socialist country is 
associated with, on average, low SWB levels, SWB increases by .15 of a standard deviation 
for an individual with a standardized ISEI of one standard deviation (above the mean) in 
comparison to social-democratic regimes. This corroborates our hypothesis III.  
An important question is whether welfare-state regime effects conceal the effects of 
relative affluence and income inequality. Model V includes gross domestic product per capita 
to test this concern. In line with previous research, GDP has a positive effect on SWB. While 
the estimates for the control variables remain substantially unchanged with reference to the 
main effect of status and the cross-level interactions, the effects for welfare-state regime 
change. While still being affected by the greatest SWB penalty, the effect of the welfare-state 
regime for those living in post-socialist societies is then smaller. These changes to Model IV 
suggest that, in part, the effects of the welfare-state regime can be explained by affluence, 
which may or may not have been fostered by the implementation of government policy. 
Similarly the effects for living in a liberal or family-oriented welfare-state regime become 
weaker, and even disappear, in the case of the conservative welfare-state regime. Adding the 
Gini coefficient in Model VI renders the main effect of status in social-democratic countries 
insignificant. Crucially the cross-level interactions remain significant. This is noteworthy as 
the inclusion of this variable leads to a sizable loss of cases. It may therefore be concluded 
that the estimates are robust. However, the main effect for the liberal welfare-state regime is 
no longer significant and the main effects for the family-oriented and post-socialist welfare-
state regimes become weaker. An important finding in Model VI is that the level of inequality 
is negatively associated with SWB, as was expected. 
Overall, our results show that welfare-state regimes affect the SWB of their 
incumbents and moderate the effects of status on SWB, net of affluence and income 
inequality.   
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Table 2  Effects on SWB, multilevel models with random intercepts, and robust standard errors. All continuous research 
variables are standardized. 
 
Model I 
(n = 184,059) 
(N = 34) 
Model II 
(n = 170,496) 
(N = 34) 
Model III 
(n = 170,496) 
(N = 34) 
Model IV 
(n = 170,496) 
(N = 34) 
Model V 
(n = 170,496) 
(N = 34) 
Model VI 
(n = 116,658) 
(N = 28) 
Fixed effects       
ISEI  0.059*** 0.058*** −0.025* −0.025* −0.020 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Macro level effects      
Welfare-state regime [Ref: social-democratic]     
Conservative   −0.437*** −0.441*** −0.131 −0.125 
   (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
Family-oriented   −0.559*** −0.576*** −0.371*** −0.324** 
   (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) 
Liberal   −0.312* −0.327* −0.215** −0.195 
   (0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.10) 
Post-socialist   −0.694*** −0.707*** −0.386*** −0.380*** 
   (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
       
Macro level controls       
GDP     0.203*** 0.212*** 
     (0.03) (0.06) 
Gini      −0.086** 
      (0.03) 
Cross-level interactions 
[Ref: Social-democratic × ISEI]      
Conservative × ISEI    0.069*** 0.069*** 0.074** 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Family-oriented × ISEI   0.076*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Liberal × ISEI    0.068* 0.068* 0.071*** 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Post-socialist × ISEI    0.146*** 0.146*** 0.154*** 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
Individual level controls      
Education  0.044** 0.045** 0.044** 0.044** 0.039** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Subjective health  0.333*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.328*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Unemployed  −0.503*** −0.497*** −0.492*** −0.492*** −0.488*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Female  0.041*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.021*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age, squared  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ESS round [Ref: Round 2002]      
2004  0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 basea 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
2006  0.014 0.013 0.014 0.015 −0.019 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
2008  −0.003 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002 −0.050 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
2010  0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024 −0.028 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
2012  0.058 0.057 0.061 0.062 −0.007 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
       
Constant −0.032 −0.961*** −0.478*** −0.458*** −0.654*** −0.569*** 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.16) 
Random effect       
SD constant 0.460 0.376 0.257 0.254 0.169 0.193 
Wald Chi-Square - 1194.817 14,656.226 24,656.762 76,864.105 191,158.107 
P > Chi-Square 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BIC 479,967.8 417,837.9 417,615.5 417,024.5 417,009.1 278,866.4 
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a. There is no harmonized Gini measure of equalized disposable income, excluding social transfers but including pensions 
available for 2002. Therefore all ESS data for this year may not be used in estimating Model VI. 
 
 
7 Discussion and Conclusions 
We have studied how welfare-state regimes shape societal subjective well-being (SWB) levels 
as well as the relationship between status and SWB on the individual level, analyzing 
European Social Survey data from 34 countries carried out over a twelve year period.9  
First, we considered status as an individual level determinant of SWB. Our multilevel 
analysis and results showed a positive correlation between status and SWB, thereby 
corroborating Hypothesis I. Status exhibited a significant effect if we simultaneously 
considered other important individual level determinants such as education, age and health. 
This large effect in respect of total education, caused presumably because it relates to 
possession of the cognitive abilities to know and satisfy one’s needs, may be partly rooted in 
financial resources and prestige, both of which are instruments in the production of well-
being, according to social production function theory (Ormel et al., 1999). However, as the 
complex multilevel models, including cross-level interactions show, status is not per se linked 
to SWB, but rather the impact it causes depends on the welfare-state regime. However, before 
discussing the related hypothesis to this, it is first necessary to evaluate the findings in regard 
to Hypothesis II which assumes that the type of welfare-state regime is linked to SWB levels. 
Countries being classified as social-democratic welfare states showed the highest SWB levels, 
while in our basic models all other welfare-state regimes display lower macro level SWB (see 
also Table A2). Through controlling for economic prosperity (GDP per capita) and income 
inequality (Gini coefficient), it was found that family-oriented and post-socialist countries 
have a significantly lower level of SWB than social-democratic countries. All in all, these 
findings strongly corroborate Hypothesis II. Furthermore, there is some evidence to support 
assumptions developed in the theoretical scenario above to exemplify and clarify hypothesis 
                                                 
9  Our final model contains only 28 countries as we do not have information on the Gini for all countries 
and periods (see note a in Table 2).  
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II. While, as expected, the social-democratic welfare-state regime type was associated with 
the highest SWB level, the conservative welfare-state regime was not the polar opposite. This 
may owe to conservative regimes, still characterized by relatively strong welfare measures, 
having, at least to some extent, the power to provide a decent standard of living. The findings 
also support Hypothesis III in that the welfare-state regime indeed proved to have an impact 
on the relationship between status and SWB. These results clearly indicate that the status-
SWB link, when controlling both for GDP and the Gini coefficient, is weakest in countries 
with a social-democratic welfare-state regime, whereas in the conservative, family-oriented, 
liberal and post-socialist types the status-SWB link is significantly stronger. This backs our 
contention that social-democratic welfare states seem to perform best in providing a decent 
standard of life to all through compensating for disadvantages that are salient for SWB. This 
does not only refer to generally enabling a decent standard of life alongside policies to reduce 
inequality as the effect remains significant even when controlling for economic strength and 
inequality, but may hint at specific social circumstances and their subjective evaluation. If 
individuals feel that there is a low level of inequality where the state compensates for 
individual disadvantages and creates the conditions for a good life, this may increase levels of 
SWB as citizens arrive at more positive affective and cognitive evaluations of their lives. 
Moreover a state that successfully supports ‘happiness for all’ may serve to reduce the impact 
critical life events have on SWB. Moreover, as our Gini measure relates to disposable income, 
countries also seem to equalize or increase inequality with regard to SWB by policy measures 
other than direct monetary transfers, such as providing services and goods. 
These findings show that welfare-state regimes are linked to SWB and that this 
relationship depends on how welfare-state regimes deal with inequality, which ties in with 
recent research that emphasizes a negative link between income inequality and SWB (e.g. 
Alesina et al. 2004; cf. Zagorski et al. 2014), which should merit more detailed exploration in 
future research.  
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The significant differences in how welfare-state regimes shape SWB and affect the 
relationship between status and SWB make the case for using welfare-state regimes 
typologies as a heuristic tool in researching inequalities. As with any typology, the placing of 
countries into these categories will have to be scrutinized and adapted against the backdrop of 
empirical evidence and theoretical development, which will prevent the results from being 
driven by a few countries coded in a particular way. In addition we conducted a level two 
outlier analysis so as to estimate the extent of bias introduced by influential countries. The 
findings demonstrate that welfare-state regimes appear to have empirical correlates, which is 
an approach demanded by Arts and Gelissen (2010). This should be investigated further as it 
was only possible to consider a limited number of macro level characteristics, owing to the 
number of countries covered in ESS data being rather low (N = 34). Consequently bias due to 
omitted variables may affect some of the findings. Nonetheless, our results encourage further 
research that employs established and new welfare-state regime classifications (e.g. Esping-
Andersen 1990, 1999; Ferrera 1996). 
Our findings concerning welfare-state differences in the relationship between status 
and SWB also point towards the need to be more cautious in social science research when 
studying status across multiple countries. However it is debatable if a comparison of status 
between countries makes sense, as the differences in prestige, living conditions and total 
income, for example, between a manual worker and a medical doctor, may be rather different 
in a social-democratic and a conservative welfare-state regime. In other words status is likely 
to mean something different in regard to both objective and subjective living conditions when 
tested in the welfare-state regimes present in, for example, Sweden and Germany. There are 
diverse conceptual positions on status in social science literature covering aspects of prestige 
and economic position. As well as the moderate number of countries under investigation in 
this analysis, further conceptual and methodological limitations need to be mentioned. In our 
analyses, we left cultural mechanisms aside and focused on material issues. Future research 
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should more strongly emphasize cultural differences in the perception and evaluation of 
inequality, but also the perception of SWB as a relative concept including a comparison of 
past and ‘idealized’ future conditions. For example, comparing Europe and the US, the more 
critical views of Europeans on inequality seem to be reflected in lower happiness levels and, 
in particular, higher social inequalities with regard to how happy different social groups are 
(Alesina et al. 2004). Thus, it would be interesting for future research to look further afield 
than the European context. A general methodological limitation of our study relates to the 
cross-sectional nature of our analysis with the data-sets pooled from the ESS. Panel data 
would allow for the reconstruction of how SWB or the relation between status and SWB 
changes, for example, following policy reforms, and how living conditions, as well as critical 
life events, shape SWB. Furthermore, although the measure of SWB consists of one item for 
life satisfaction and one item for happiness, it could be argued that it does not constitute a 
psycho-metrically adequate construct of SWB. 
In conclusion, our findings indicate that Scandinavian countries perform best in the 
provision of a good standard of life as well as ‘happiness for all’, and, moreover, that this is 
not just rooted in strong anti-inequality measures. This study should motivate further research 
on the complex relationship between inequality and SWB in diverse welfare-state regimes, 
which is highly relevant for policy-makers across Europe as they deliberate upon how to 
create and maintain the conditions for a good standard of life in spite of economic pressures.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  Effects on SWB per welfare-state regime, multilevel models with random intercepts and robust standard errors. 
All continuous research variables are standardized. 
 Model IIa Model IIb Model IIc Model IId Model IIe 
 Conservative 
WSR 
Social-democratic 
WSR 
Family-oriented 
WSR 
Liberal WSR Post-socialist 
WSR 
 (n = 36,438) 
(N = 7) 
(n = 28,114) 
(N =5) 
(n = 31,640) 
(N = 7) 
(n = 21,003) 
(N = 3) 
(n = 53,301) 
(N = 13) 
Fixed effects      
ISEI 0.044*** 0.005 0.061*** 0.047* 0.096*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Education 0.053* −0.045 0.025 0.042 0.107*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Subjective health 0.314*** 0.271*** 0.305*** 0.321*** 0.388*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Unemployed −0.551*** −0.341*** −0.449*** −0.562*** −0.502*** 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) 
Female 0.051*** 0.082*** −0.010 0.017 0.049*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Age −0.014* −0.012*** −0.022*** −0.021* −0.030*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age, squared 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ESS round [Ref: round 2002]     
      
2004 −0.017 0.014* 0.041 −0.003 0.060 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) 
2006 −0.029 0.010 0.003 −0.021 0.143 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.10) 
2008 −0.013 0.025* −0.106 −0.022 0.144 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) (0.12) 
2010 0.038 0.020 −0.187 −0.028 0.226* 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.13) (0.04) (0.10) 
2012 0.095 0.057* −0.131 −0.011 0.237* 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.12) 
Constant −0.751*** −0.369*** −0.756*** −0.718* −1.293*** 
 (0.15) (0.10) (0.22) (0.36) (0.21) 
Random effect      
SD constant 0.171 0.090 0.268 0.228 0.292 
Log likelihood −42,263.315 −26,708.095 −39,700.686 −24,880.075 −71,343.697 
BIC 84,600.2 53,467.4 79,473.9 49,790.0 142,818.0 
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Table A2  Descriptive statistics of research and control variables by welfare-state regime (WSR) type. 
Variable Operationalization Conservative WSR 
Social-
democratic 
WSR 
Family-
oriented  
WSR 
Liberal WSR Post-socialist WSR 
Subjective 
Well-Being 
Two-item scale 
reflecting affectual 
and cognitive 
dimension of SWB: 
happiness and life 
satisfaction 
Mean (SD) 
7.16 (1.83) 
Mean (SD) 
8.04 (1.42) 
Mean (SD) 
6.72 (2.04) 
Mean (SD) 
7.29 (1.84) 
Mean (SD) 
5.76 (2.18) 
Status 
International Socio-
Economic Index 
(ISEI) 
Mean(SD) 
45.82(17.21) 
Mean(SD) 
45.38(18.21) 
Mean(SD) 
39.76(17.48) 
Mean(SD) 
43.78(17.74) 
Mean(SD) 
41.60(17.86) 
GDP 
Logged GDP per 
capita, by country, 
and period 
Mean(SD) 
10.52(0.06) 
Mean(SD) 
10.81(0.21) 
Mean(SD) 
10.02(0.44) 
Mean(SD) 
10.46(0.33) 
Mean(SD) 
9.14(0.66) 
Gini 
Gini coefficient of 
equivalized 
disposable income 
before social 
transfers by country 
and period 
(pensions excluded 
from social 
transfers, i.e., they 
are included in this 
Gini measure) 
Mean(SD) 
35.10(1.30) 
Mean(SD) 
34.44(2.23) 
Mean(SD) 
36.26(2.91) 
Mean(SD) 
39.31(3.95) 
Mean(SD) 
35.42(2.61) 
Educational 
level 
Proportion of 
people with at least 
ISCED level 3a 
(upper secondary 
degree, high) and 
above 
ISCED level 
3a and above 
= 43.68% 
ISCED level 
below 3a = 
56.32% 
ISCED level 
3a and above 
= 61.37% 
ISCED level 
below 3a = 
38.63% 
ISCED level 
3a and above 
= 34.85% 
ISCED level 
below 3a = 
65.15% 
ISCED level 
3a and above 
= 45.74% 
ISCED level 
below 3a = 
44.26% 
ISCED level 
3a and above 
= 68.77% 
ISCED level 
below 3a = 
31.23% 
Age Age in years Mean(SD) 50.84(12.19) 
Mean(SD) 
51.21(12.68) 
Mean(SD) 
49.94(12.69) 
Mean(SD) 
50.82(12.39) 
Mean(SD) 
51.41(12.20) 
Age, squared Age in years, squared 
Mean (SD) 
2733.33 
(1272.64) 
Mean (SD) 
2783.10 
(1311.85) 
Mean (SD) 
2654.96 
(1311.22) 
Mean (SD) 
2736.56 
(1284.51) 
Mean (SD) 
2792.26 
(1286.05) 
Subjective 
general health 
(1 very bad, 5 very 
good) 
Mean(SD) 
3.73(0.85) 
Mean(SD) 
3.98(0.87) 
Mean(SD) 
3.65(0.86) 
Mean(SD) 
3.90(0.92) 
Mean(SD) 
3.21(0.82) 
Unemployed 
Unemployed, 
looking actively for 
job (last 7 days) vs 
all other 
3.13% 2.61% 5.77% 2.66% 4.33% 
Female Self-reported sex 51.59% 49.34% 52.90% 53.05% 57.75% 
a. Weighted (population size weight, design weight). For conservative, social-democratic, family-oriented, liberal, and post-socialist WSR n 
ranges between 25,009 and 38,628, 23,562 and 28,784, 29,039 and 37,595, 12,837 and 22,110, and 33,554 and 57,105, respectively.    
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